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Merely to note< the institutionalization of intellectual life and the 
embourgeoisement of intellectuals is to suggest the dangers of our own 
time. This puts a university that respects the life of the mind under the 
obligation to keep every aspect of intellectual life open and free and, 
hardly less important, to provide the most favorable conditions, of time, 
space, resources, for its pursuit. And in doing this, it should remember 
what I have not yet mentioned about the fostering of my life of the 
mind: that though the mind is wonderfully generative and the energy 
of ideas forever renewable, the transfer of energy, in universities as in 
life, is generational. I will not name them here though if I did it would 
be after Buber's fashion when he acknowledged Dilthey as "my teach 
er"?I will not name them now, but it is only because of the generative 
example of great teachers?teachers who had a vocation, teachers who 
had and shared the life of the mind?that I am standing here. 
Sherman Paul 
A Footnote 
When great teachers?challenging teachers?are discussed, it is like 
a group of stone age hunters sitting around a fire describing an animal 
they had glimpsed at various times and under different circumstances. 
Allan D. Vestal 
The Humanities and the Professions*, the Rise of Bioethics 
I have used the term "bioethics" in my title. It is not as familiar a 
term as "medical ethics," but it has become current as rapid develop 
ments in the biological sciences, genetics for example, have raised new 
ethical questions both for researchers and medical practitioners. 
It would be comforting to report that this renewed interest in ethics 
grew up in the great university centers of study in the humanities, but 
I cannot. Rather the Nuremberg trials and the code of ethics for medical 
experiments that they produced, began a development which accelerated 
in the 1960s with much publicized advances in medical technology and 
biological research. I need only mention the appearance of dialysis and 
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the attention given to the first heart transplants. On the research side, 
the Tuskegee study of syphilis, revealed in 1971, joined a list of 
problematic studies involving human subjects that came to public 
attention and stirred much debate. 
The concerns generated by these develpments have in many cases also 
become issues for public policy, in part because of massive infusions of 
federal money into medical education, into medical and biological 
research, and into the support of technologies like dialysis which would 
be prohibitively expensive without government subsidy. In 1974 Con 
gress created a National Commission for the Protection of Human 
Subjects of Biom?dical and Behavioral Research with an explicit man 
date to consider the ethical implications of governmental policies and 
programs. That commission has been succeeded by others including a 
presidential commission which is now looking into ethical issues in 
volved in the distribution of health care. 
These events, which I have only sketched, occurred against the 
background of developments in medicine which had already brought 
about profound changes. One is the changing role of the hospital which 
has become the preferred place for providing much modern health care. 
Since the Hill-Burton Act of 1946, federal money has created hospitals 
large and small all over the United States, and various insurances and 
public programs have made them available to a great many people. A 
second development, already mentioned, has been the predominance of 
science and technology. A third has been the tendency to specialization 
in medicine. All these have resulted in changes in the personal relation 
ships of medical professionals and those they serve and made the family 
physician all but unknown. 
Concern for the freedom and dignity of those involved in medical 
experiments or of patients whose lives are being artificially prolonged 
by the new technology available in the modern hospital is surely a 
proper concern for the humanities. But it is only just to point out that 
it was a physician, Henry Beecher of Harvard, who called attention to 
abuses in experimentation and that among those who called attention 
to what were then feared to be real hazards in DNA research was a 
researcher, Paul Berg of Stanford. They can stand today for all those 
within medicine and the life sciences who said and did what the 
humanist interested in ethics can only applaud. But since we are 
interested today in the reciprocal influence of the humanities and the 
professions, medicine in particular, it should be said clearly that there 
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is little evidence that the rise of bioethics in the past twenty years owes 
much to the humanities as university disciplines. In part that is a result 
of the broader segregation of medicine from the rest of the university. 
But it is in part also the result of the recent history of the teaching of 
ethics in America. 
Douglas Sloan, who has studied the teaching of ethics in the under 
graduate curriculum of the American university between 1876 and 1976, 
reminds us that Thomas Jefferson declared higher education was to 
produce "an aristocracy of talent and virtue." Moral philosophy, often 
taught by the president of the university to the senior class, had a central 
role in the curriculum. It was moral philosophy which attempted to 
preserve the unity of the curriculum and thereby ensure the existence 
of a unified and intelligible universe of discourse. But moral philosophy 
also sought to help form the character and disposition of the individual 
student by awakening the student's own ethical concerns and inspiring 
the pursuit of personal moral development. The entire college curricu 
lum and environment had the same purpose. Even as the reform of the 
American university began, which swept away the traditional moral 
philosophy course, Daniel Coit Gilman of Johns Hopkins could still say 
"The object of the university is to develop character?to make men." 
In the reformed American university, the vision of a unified curricu 
lum and culture of learning was abandoned, and the ethical, social and 
character concerns once central to higher education gave way to an 
emphasis on research and specialized training. Important figures in the 
emerging social sciences, many of whom began their work under the 
impetus of vital ethical concerns, concluded that their influence would 
be greater if they embraced the role of the indispensable expert who 
provided needed knowledge to government and business leaders in 
positions to shape public policy. The teaching of ethics, whatever there 
was of it, returned to departments of philosophy, though here and there 
courses or even departments of social ethics remained for a time. One 
sign that ethics continued to be taught was the publication in 1908 of 
the text Ethics by John Dewey and James H. Tufts. The book went 
through thirty-five printings before it was revised in 1932. The book's 
three sections dealt with the history of ethics, a theory of ethics, and 
"the world of action." Whatever the success of the book and the courses 
in which it was used, it is nonetheless clear that in the reformed 
American university with its diversity of disciplines and wealth of 
?lectives, few students elected to study ethics. Even though by 1910 new 
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interest in professional ethics appeared, the ideal of making ethics a part 
of university education generally was gone. 
These shifts in the role of ethics in the university curriculum 
coincided with developments in the field of ethics itself. The very 
existence of ethics as a rational discipline was questioned by scientific 
method. Many saw ethical values as noncognitive, nonrational, frequent 
ly as mere epiphenomena of underlying biological, economic, and social 
forces. The emerging social sciences were seen as objective, value-free 
enterprises, while ethical values were expressions of subjective prefer 
ences. The influence of logical positivism and emotivist theories of 
ethics pushed its teaching further from concern with normative ethics 
and toward metaethics, concerned with the meanings of ethical terms 
and judgments and their justifications. Ethics became the concern of 
specialists, although what actually happened in the classroom is a subject 
for speculation, since textbooks continued to deal not only with a variety 
of ethical theories, but with normative and practical problems as well. 
It is also true that many colleges and universities with departments of 
religion, including this university, had courses in ethics under its 
sponsorship. But notwithstanding the efforts of some, the Jeffersonian 
notion of the university as a place for the development of an aristocracy 
of talent and virtue has been largely abandoned. 
In our examination of the role of the humanities in the university, 
it is worth asking, I think, whether there are some special problems for 
ethics in the contemporary secular university. Any reader of a daily 
paper is aware that issues of great ethical import, ranging from abortion 
to nuclear war to racism to women's rights are discussed, debated and 
sometimes litigated in a variety of forums. Some are a part of classroom 
instruction and discussion. Opportunities for information, debate and 
political action are provided by many student and community organiza 
tions. I know of no constitutional barriers to a searching consideration 
of the nature of ethics or to the study of these and similar ethical 
problems. That appears to be true of religious as well as of philosophical 
ethics, so long as the study is objective and is part of a secular program 
of education. 
The university as an institution, moreover, has commitments to 
ethical values. Structures such as the Office of Affirmative Action or the 
various institutional review boards which must pass on research involv 
ing human subjects are expressions of ethical concerns. But I believe that 
it is true that the university has trouble with the notion that it is 
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promoting virtue, that it is building character, that it wishes its gradu 
ates to be 
"good" men and women. Not that the university wishes its 
graduates to be without character or wicked; the problem rather lies in 
the absence of a consensus about what it means to be good, or virtuous 
or wise. We must return to this problem, but first we must look further 
at the situation of medicine within our educational culture. 
In 1876 the Johns Hopkins University and Hospital in Baltimore 
were formally opened. The principal speaker on the occasion was 
Thomas Huxley, trained physician and famed biologist. In the course 
of a lengthy address on the purposes of education at Johns Hopkins, and 
on the purposes of medical education in particular, Huxley remarked: 
Depend upon it, there is only one way of really ennobling 
any calling, and that is to make those who pursue it real 
masters of their craft, men who can truly do that which they 
profess to be able to do, and which they are credited with 
being able to do by the public. And there is no position so 
ignoble as that of the so-called "liberally educated practition 
er," who may be able to read Galen in the original; who 
knows all the plants from the Cedar of Lebanon to the hyssop 
upon the wall; but who finds himself with the issues of life 
and death in his hands, ignorant, blundering, and bewildered, 
because of his ignorance of the essential and fundamental 
truths upon which practice must be based (Huxley, 1968, 3: 
249). 
Huxley's comments came at a turning point in American medical 
education, and he serves today as a spokesman for those who moved 
medical education away from the classical patterns of much nineteenth 
century university teaching to a newer pattern with emphasis on the 
basic sciences and clinical training in a hospital. The shift was made 
permanent with the Flexner Report for the Carnegie Foundation (1910), 
for the adoption of its recommendations swept away many medical 
schools which could not meet its 
rigid scientific standards. It is the 
Flexner Report which emphasized the importance of teaching medicine 
in 
university centers, on a scientific basis subject to university standards, 
by a faculty of university professors, and with extensive clinical experi 
ence provided in hospitals under university control. 
But for all the emphasis on the university setting of medical educa 
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tion, there has been on the whole a curious absence of interaction 
between medicine as a discipline and most other university disciplines, 
except for the biological sciences. In some cases medical faculties even 
formed their own programs or departments of basic sciences which were 
distinct from programs in the same sciences elsewhere in the university. 
It is of interest, however, to note that Anglo-American medicine did 
produce codes of ethics during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
The first of these was produced in England by Thomas Percival in 1803. 
For Percival the major questions of medical ethics were who shall 
practice medicine, in what relationships with other practitioners and 
with what obligations to patients, institutions, and public authority. The 
codes of the American Medical Association were heavily influenced by 
Percival and continued to deal with similar questions, especially in an 
effort to separate scientific medicine from quackery (Fox: 83; Konoid: 
14-31; Waddington). 
Medicine has been regarded as one of the first of the "professions" 
and its codes of professional ethics have served a number of functions. 
A code helps to define the standards of competence required of the 
profession; it defines relationships among various competencies within 
the profession; it defines the relationship of the professional to the 
persons he or she serves; and it defines a standard of integrity that is 
typically demanded of the professional. It also lays down rules of 
etiquette, often in response to quite practical problems, that are meant 
to minimize friction within the profession and thus maintain public 
confidence (Emmet, 158-66; Konoid: 10; Waddington: 39). 
But it is clear that such codes of professional ethics do not generally 
deal with matters typical of philosophical or religious ethics and thus 
of the humanities. In Fox's summary then: 
Because it was segregated from both moral philosophy and 
political economy, medical thought about human relation 
ships remained?or became?rigidly individualistic. In sharp 
contrast, medical science, addressed to such issues as the 
spread and control of epidemics, differential susceptibility to 
illness, and the relationship between environment and disease, 
was increasingly sophisticated about issues which, from a 
late-twentieth-century perspective, are at the center of moral 
debate. Yet medical scientists engaged these matters without 
reference to the intellectual tools of medical or general ethics 
or of the social sciences (Fox: 90-91). 
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What is fundamental to the authority of medicine or any of the 
professions is competence. Without it every other basis for authority 
will quickly disappear. With that in mind we can say something about 
the humanities and the medical profession. 
There can be no relationship between medicine and the humanities 
in the university which dilutes or compromises the commitment of the 
medical profession to competence of the highest order in treating those 
with health care needs. One of the characteristics of medicine is that 
it is a practical science directed to the prevention and cure of disease. 
It does its work by the application of scientific method and the knowl 
edge gained by that method. Medicine therefore tugs the humanities in 
the directions of action. It reminds ethics that, whatever the importance 
and legitimacy of its internal concerns, ethics is a practical science 
because ethical reasoning concludes not in proposition but in action. The 
commitment of medicine to reasoned, scientific method is also a warn 
ing to ethics that it is doomed to irrelevance unless it can offer a reasoned 
account of its own procedures and methods that will elicit the agreement 
of the very diverse men and women who are the profession and of those 
it serves. 
There is another and perhaps ironic pull of medicine on ethics. It is 
ironic because I cited Fox's comment that medical thought about human 
relationships became or remained individualistic. I believe that is clearly 
true and that it remains true of a significant number in the profession. 
But in the light of contemporary interest in such things as medicine and 
the environment or the continuing debate about the just allocation of 
medical resources or a right to health care, it seems clear that medicine 
is now pulling ethics in the direction of politics. Many of the ethical 
concerns of modern medicine amply demonstrate the inadequacy of the 
individualism which long dominated medical thought and which has 
long been a part of the American ethos (See Bellah, 1975: 112-38). Issues 
raised by plans to provide needed health care while preserving the 
unique character of the physician-patient relationship may finally drive 
both ethics and political theory to a new consideration of the relation 
of individual persons and the professional to the community. The 
classical humanist could only rejoice in a new recognition that the 
genuinely human being is a political being. 
But the new and increased interaction between medicine and the 
humanities runs the other way too. Without pretending for a moment 
that the humanistic influence is always or even principally academic, 
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I would argue that in the university the humanities can call attention 
to some important considerations. 
Medicine deals often with matters of life and death, and at times with 
long and intractable suffering. Perhaps there is not another context in 
which convictions about the meaning and value of human existence are 
so 
severely tested as in the experience of suffering and death. From the 
author of Job to the author of "Why Bad Things Happen to Good 
People," philosophers and theologians have struggled with these myster 
ies. In the face of recurring temptation to dehumanize suffering and 
death by treating them only as matters fit for technological solution, the 
humanities have much to offer. In bioethics there is already an extensive 
literature on death and dying, and much attention to the special 
problems of prolonging life with the tools available to modern medicine. 
And there is another cluster of problems and a large literature on 
problems at the beginning of life when the newborn child suffers from 
serious congenital anomalies. The nature and extent of ethical obliga 
tions to the defective newborn or to those adults whose lives appear to 
be ending cannot be separated from our broader understanding of human 
life, its destiny and its worth in the face of suffering and death, questions 
which lie at the heart of the humanities. 
Finally, the humanities can continue to call attention to the impor 
tance of justice in the distribution of needed health care. To speak of 
justice in the medical context suggests larger but related issues in our 
national life. Issues such as health care planning are enormously com 
plex and require both competence in the economics of health care and 
well developed political judgment. The role of the humanist in these 
matters may in one sense be very modest; we do not look to the 
humanities for detailed solutions to such problems. But we can and 
should expect the humanities, including ethics, to persist in asking 
questions, to refuse to be silenced in the face of technological or other 
imperatives which threaten to obscure persons in a blizzard of cost/ 
benefit ratios and to strip them of their dignity and rights as human 
beings in the interests of bureaucratic efficiency. Scientific medicine and 
the humanities may find in their common concern for the human person 
a 
unique focal point for collaboration. 
The university brings together the medical professional, the student 
aspiring to enter the profession, and extensive resources in the humani 
ties. At every stage in the education of medical professionals in such a 
setting there is at least the opportunity for interaction. Whether in the 
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general education of the undergraduate planning to enter medical school 
or in the training of medical students and post-graduate residents, the 
university setting offers opportunity. There are also many practical 
problems, including already crowded curricula, which prevent the 
realization of those opportunities. But in an atmosphere of mutual 
respect and a concern for persons that is shared by teachers and students 
I believe there is no setting which can promise richer results. 
John Boyle 
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An Addendum 
As a point of departure in considering the future of higher education, 
one can state, with a high degree of assurance, that there will continue 
to be a large educational establishment, not just in the United States but 
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